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example, the Maudsley Program improves data gathering behavior (Garety et al., 2015), which has 
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Abstract 
Delusions have been repeatedly linked to reduced engagement in analytic (i.e., conscious and effortful) 
reasoning. However, the mechanisms underlying this relationship remain unclear. One hypothesis is 
that less analytic reasoning might maintain persecutory delusions by reducing belief flexibility. An 
important aspect of belief flexibility is the ability to revise beliefs in response to disconfirmatory 
evidence. The present study recruited 231 participants from the general population that represented a 
wide range of paranoid ideation. They completed tasks in which they encountered a series of 
ambiguous scenarios with initially-appealing explanations that were later disconfirmed by statements 
supporting alternative interpretations. Three types of scenarios were employed: two presented 
participants with emotionally valenced explanations (i.e., negative or positive) and one presented 
participants with emotionally neutral explanations. For? each type of reasoning scenario, impaired 
belief revision ability was found to partially mediate the relationship between reduced engagement in 
analytic reasoning and persecutory ideation. These results are consistent with the notion that reduced 
engagement in analytic reasoning may help maintain paranoid delusions by interfering with the ability 
to revise beliefs in the presence of disconfirmatory information. 
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1 Although the effects of the Maudsley Review Training Program on analytic reasoning have not been 
empirically examined, there is reason to believe that this therapy may increase analytic reasoning. For 
example, the Maudsley Program improves data gathering behavior (Garety et al., 2015), which has 
been related to reduced engagement in analytic reasoning in the general population (Ross et al., 2016). 
Additionally, the Maudsley Program is part of a series of therapies ultimately leading to SlowMo, 
which has been described as targeting analytic reasoning (Ward & Garety, 2017).  
Potential Pathways to Paranoia: Analytic Thinking and Belief Flexibility 
 Belief inflexibility—the metacognitive capacity to reflect on one’s beliefs, revise them in 
response to evidence, and generate and consider alternatives (Ward & Garety, 2017)—has been 
repeatedly observed in delusional individuals. Across studies, both interview and task-based measures 
of belief inflexibility are robustly associated with multiple dimensions of delusion severity, most 
notably with conviction in delusional beliefs (Zhu, Sun, & So, 2018). Interview-based measures 
suggest that individuals with delusions often fail to acknowledge the possibility that their delusional 
beliefs may be mistaken and seldom consider alternative accounts of the evidence that they perceive as 
supporting these beliefs (Freeman et al., 2004; Garety et al., 2005). Indeed, individuals with delusions 
exhibit a cognitive bias against revising even delusion-neutral beliefs in response to disconfirmatory 
evidence (McLean, Mattiske, & Balzan, 2017; Sanford et al., 2014). 
 Recent research suggests that belief inflexibility in individuals with persecutory delusions can 
be understood within the context of dual-process reasoning frameworks. These frameworks posit that 
human reasoning proceeds via two systems: one system (analytic reasoning) that is conscious, effortful, 
and dependent upon working memory, and another (experiential reasoning) that is autonomous, 
effortless, and utilizes associative learning processes (Evans, 2003). Although self-report studies 
examining experiential reasoning in relation to persecutory ideation have thus far been inconclusive, 
these studies suggest that individuals with persecutory delusions, as well as individuals experiencing 
more subclinical paranoia, may exhibit lower levels of analytic reasoning (Freeman, Lister, & Evans, 
2014; Freeman, Evans, & Lister, 2012). Consistent with this suggestion, reasoning task performance in 
individuals with delusions is indicative of less engagement in analytic reasoning (Speechley, 
Woodward, & Ngan, 2013; Speechley, Murray, McKay, Munz, & Ngan, 2010). 
While the link between delusions and less analytic reasoning has been well-supported, the 
mechanisms explaining this association remain unclear. One hypothesis is that reduced engagement in 
1 Although the effects of the Maudsley Review Training Program on analytic reasoning have not been 
empirically examined, there is reason to believe that this therapy may increase analytic reasoning. For 
example, the Maudsley Program improves data gathering behavior (Garety et al., 2015), which has 
been related to reduced engagement in analytic reasoning in the general population (Ross et al., 2016). 
Additionally, the Maudsley Program is part of a series of therapies ultimately leading to SlowMo, 
which has been described as targeting analytic reasoning (Ward & Garety, 2017).  
analytic reasoning might encourage belief inflexibility and thereby maintain persecutory delusions 
(Ward & Garety, 2017). Broadly consistent with this notion, the reduction in paranoia engendered by 
the Maudsley Review Training Program, a therapy that might encourage analytic reasoning,1 may be 
partially mediated by an increase in individuals’ willingness to acknowledge that their delusional 
beliefs may be mistaken (Garety et al., 2015). This notion is also consistent with theory positing that 
reduced modulation toward analytic reasoning in the face of cognitive conflict might promote a bias 
against disconfirmatory evidence (BADE; a specific facet of belief inflexibility) in delusional 
individuals (Speechley, 2012; Speechley & Ngan, 2008). Accordingly, belief inflexibility (BADE) may 
form part of the pathway from reduced engagement in analytic reasoning to paranoia. 
The Present Study 
The present study aimed to increase our understanding of this potential pathway to paranoia by 
testing whether lower levels of analytic reasoning engagement are related to higher levels of bias 
against disconfirmatory evidence (Hypothesis 1) and whether the relationship between reduced 
engagement in analytic reasoning and persecutory ideation is partially mediated by bias against 
disconfirmatory evidence (Hypothesis 2). These hypotheses were tested using both emotion-laden 
(negative and positive) and emotion-neutral variants of a popular belief revision task (the BADE task; 
original version: Woodward et al., 2006). This strategy allowed for three internal replication tests of 
Hypotheses 1 and 2. This strategy also facilitated an exploratory analysis inspired by previous research 
suggesting that delusion-prone individuals may exhibit similar impairments in the revision of emotion-
laden and emotion-neutral beliefs (e.g., Buchy, Woodward, & Liotti, 2007; Riccaboni et al., 2012). This 
prior research implies that delusion-prone individuals may have a general belief revision deficit that 
manifests similarly regardless of the emotional valence of the initial belief and of corresponding 
disconfirmatory evidence. This possibility was examined using a post-hoc commonality analysis.  
 
Method 
Participants and Sampling Strategy 
 Participants (N = 343) were recruited to participate in this study via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk 
(MTurk). MTurk is a crowdsourcing internet marketplace where people from diverse backgrounds 
participate in research studies in exchange for financial compensation. People who are willing to 
participate in studies via MTurk are sufficiently diverse for research on clinical and mental health 
outcomes (Chandler & Shapiro, 2016). 
 Participants were only recruited if they were 18 or older and lived in the United States. 
Individuals meeting these specifications were recruited via a gradual oversampling strategy involving 
two waves of data collection. During the first wave, 219 individuals who completed the study were 
recruited without regard to their paranoid symptom severity (i.e., recruitment was unselected). During 
the second wave, participants were recruited on the basis of their endorsement of high levels of 
paranoia in a screening survey. In total, 742 individuals completed the Green et al. Paranoid Thoughts 
Scale-B. The 93 individuals endorsing the highest levels of paranoia were invited to complete the main 
study. Ultimately, 12 of these individuals completed the entire study, bringing the total number of study 
participants to 231 (demographics and details regarding retention: SI Section S0). The results of this 
study were extremely similar when excluding these 12 individuals (SI Section S0). 
Data Quality 
 Several steps were taken to ensure high data quality. Following recommendations for research 
using crowdsourced samples (Chandler & Shapiro, 2016; Johnson & Borden, 2012), only MTurk 
workers with a history of providing good-quality responses (i.e., an acceptance ratio of ≥ 96%) were 
allowed to participate. Further, participants were required to correctly answer a question designed to 
discriminate participants who paid careful attention to study materials from those who did not do so. 
Participants failing to correctly answer this question were not allowed to complete the study and their 
data were not considered in any analyses. Finally, the data were screened for repeating GPS coordinates 
 
to further ensure that responses were valid and unique. Data collected from MTurk workers with 
similar quality requirements have been shown to be comparable to data collected in the laboratory 
(Chandler & Shapiro, 2016; Johnson & Borden, 2012). 
Symptom Measures 
 Green et al. Paranoid Thoughts Scale-B (GPTS-B). The GPTS-B (Green et al., 2008; example 
item: “People have intended me harm”) is a 16-item self-report measure of dispositional persecutory 
ideation. Participants rate on a five-point scale (1 = “Not at all,” 5 = “Totally) how well each item 
corresponds to their thoughts and feelings about others over the past month. The GPTS-B is sensitive to 
clinically significant changes in paranoia and has excellent internal consistency in community samples 
(α = .92 in Green et al., 2008; in the present study: ωt = .98, α = .98). The validity of the GPTS-B in 
nonclinical individuals is supported by research showing that higher GPTS-B scores in these 
individuals are associated with a greater likelihood of reporting persecutory ideation during a virtual 
reality experience (Freeman et al., 2010). 
Cognitive Tasks 
 Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT). The CRT (Frederick, 2005; example item: “How many cubic 
feet of dirt are there in a hole that is three feet deep by three feet wide by three feet long?”) measures 
analytic thinking by presenting participants with several problems that have intuitive-but-incorrect 
responses that must be overridden to arrive at the correct answer. The version of the CRT employed 
here consisted of seven items: three reworded items from the original CRT (via Shenhav, Rand, & 
Greene, 2012) and the four-item non-numeric CRT (Thomson & Oppenheimer, 2016). Previous 
research has shown that this seven-item version of the CRT has acceptable reliability (Pennycook & 
Rand, 2017). Scores on the CRT represent the number of correct answers given by participants. Higher 
scores reflect greater cognitive ability and/or a more analytic cognitive style (greater willingness to 
engage in analytic reasoning). In the present study, the seven-item CRT had good internal consistency 
(ωt = .86, α = .81). Although previous studies examining analytic reasoning in the context of paranoia 
 
have employed the rational-experiential inventory (e.g., Freeman, Lister, & Evans, 2014), the CRT was 
used here-in because research indicates that performance on the CRT may reflect the default-
interventionist function ascribed to analytic reasoning in extant theories linking delusions to dual-
process reasoning deficits (see Speechley & Ngan, 2008; Travers, Rolison, & Feeney, 2016; Ward & 
Garety, 2017). 
 The Bias Against Disconfirmatory Evidence (BADE) task. Participants completed three 
versions of the BADE task (original version: Woodward et al., 2006). The first two versions were 
emotional variants of the BADE task that have been previously used to study belief inflexibility in the 
context of depression and social anxiety (Everaert et al., 2018). The emotional BADE task features two 
sets of stimuli. The first set, which consists of disconfirming-the-negative scenarios, lures participants 
into endorsing a negative interpretation that must then be revised in the face of information suggesting 
that a more positive interpretation is warranted. The second set, which consists of disconfirming-the-
positive scenarios, encourages positive interpretations that must then be revised in the face of 
information suggesting a more negative interpretation is warranted. Participants also completed a third 
version of the BADE task. This third version of the BADE task was designed to have emotionally 
neutral content (like the original BADE task) and self-referential scenarios (like the emotional BADE 
task). This novel version of the BADE task was created to allow for exploratory investigations into the 
nature of the belief revision deficit in paranoid individuals. 
  Each of these BADE task versions consisted of 12 self-referential scenarios (examples: SI 
Section S1) that comprised three statements. After viewing each statement, participants rated how well 
four interpretations (presented in randomized order) described the events of the scenario on a 21-point 
scale (1 = “poor,” 21 = “excellent”). Across scenarios, these interpretations could be grouped into three 
categories. Each scenario contained two Lure interpretations (arbitrarily divided into two subcategories, 
Lure-A and Lure-B, for consistency with the original BADE task), one True interpretation, and one 
Absurd interpretation. Lure interpretations were initially the most plausible explanations for the events 
 
in the scenario but became less so by the scenario’s end. True interpretations were initially moderately 
plausible and became the most plausible by the scenario’s end. Absurd interpretations remained 
consistently implausible throughout each scenario. Although some prior studies using the BADE task 
(e.g., Bronstein & Cannon, 2017) have employed a small number of scenarios breaking this pattern, 
such scenarios were not included in the present study to reduce participant burden. 
Procedure 
 Participants completed this study over the course of three days. This design feature was 
intended to limit participant fatigue. On the first day, informed consent was obtained in accordance 
with the Yale University Institutional Review Board. Participants then completed basic demographic 
questions, 12 BADE task scenarios (4 disconfirming-the-positive scenarios, 4 disconfirming-the-
negative scenarios, and four neutral scenarios, presented in random order), and several additional 
measures (including the GPTS-B and CRT, in random order). On the second and third day of the study, 
participants completed 12 additional BADE task scenarios (4 from each task version). Participants were 
provided with remuneration (4.5 USD) for completing the entire study. 
Data Reduction and Analyses 
 Analysis of data from each version of the BADE task began by averaging participants’ ratings 
for each category of interpretation (Lure-A, Lure-B, True, and Absurd) across all scenarios from that 
task version. As in past research (Bronstein & Cannon, 2017; Everaert et al., 2018), the resulting 12 
average ratings were subjected to Principal Component Analysis (PCA) with direct oblimin rotation 
(i.e., the extracted components were allowed to be correlated). PCA results for data from each version 
of the BADE task are reported in SI Sections S2-S3. 
 In accordance with previous research (Bronstein & Cannon, 2017), PCA suggested that data 
from the neutral BADE task could be reduced to two components. The first component, “Evidence 
Integration Impairment,” reflects the inability to revise beliefs in response to disambiguating 
information. The second component, “Positive Response Bias,” reflects willingness to provide high 
 
plausibility ratings to interpretations. Note that other researchers (e.g., Sanford et al., 2014) call these 
components “Evidence Integration” and “Conservatism,” respectively. In keeping with our previous 
research, we call them “Evidence Integration Impairment” (to highlight higher component scores’ 
reflection of poorer evidence integration ability) and “Positive Response Bias” (to highlight higher 
component scores’ reflection of a less conservative response style and avoid confusion with political 
conservatism). 
Also in accordance with previous research (Everaert et al., 2018), PCA suggested that data from 
the emotional BADE task’s disconfirming-the-negative and disconfirming-the-positive scenarios could 
be reduced to three components. For disconfirming-the-negative scenarios, these components were 
“Negative Interpretation Bias” (which reflects a bias toward endorsing interpretations for ambiguous 
events that have a negative emotional valence), “Positive Interpretation Bias (which reflects a bias 
toward endorsing interpretations for ambiguous events that have a positive emotional valence), and 
“Negative Interpretation Inflexibility” (which reflects inability to revise negative interpretations in 
response to disambiguating information which suggests that a more positive interpretation may be 
warranted). For disconfirming-the-positive scenarios, these components were “Negative Interpretation 
Bias,” “Positive Interpretation Bias,” and “Positive Interpretation Inflexibility” (which reflects inability 
to revise positive interpretations in response to disambiguating information which suggests that a more 
negative interpretation may be warranted). The ability of this procedure to separate interpretation bias 
and inflexibility in ambiguous emotional contexts is notable given evidence that paranoid individuals 
may exhibit a negative interpretation bias that is related to reduced cognitive flexibility (i.e., a reduced 
awareness of or willingness to consider the alternatives in a given situation; Savulich, Freeman, 
Shergill, & Yiend, 2015). 
 These PCA-derived components were entered into multiple regression models in order to test 
both of this study’s hypotheses. The hypothesis that analytic cognitive style would be related to BADE 
(Hypothesis 1) was tested using three multiple regression models. In each model, one measure of belief 
 
inflexibility (Evidence Integration Impairment, Positive Interpretation Inflexibility, or Negative 
Interpretation Inflexibility) was entered as the criterion variable. Measures of analytic cognitive style 
(CRT scores) and measures of response/interpretation bias (Negative Interpretation Bias and Positive 
Interpretation Bias, or Positive Response Bias) were entered as predictors. The hypothesis that the 
relationship between analytic cognitive style and persecutory ideation would be partially explained by 
the mutual relationship between these variables and the bias against disconfirmatory evidence 
(Hypothesis 2) was also tested using three mediation models. In each model (PROCESS Model 4; 
Preacher & Hayes, 2004), one measure of belief inflexibility (Evidence Integration Impairment, 
Positive Interpretation Inflexibility, or Negative Interpretation Inflexibility) was entered as a potential 
mediator. A post-hoc commonality analysis was conducted (in R; see Nimon et al., 2008) using a 
multiple regression model in which measures of belief revision ability derived from each type of 
scenario were simultaneously entered as predictors of paranoia. Commonality analysis partitions the 
variance in the criterion variable explained via a multiple regression model into variance unique to a 
given predictor variable and variance shared between combinations of predictors (see Nimon & 
OsWald, 2013). 
 Collinearity statistics were within acceptable limits for all regression models used to test 
Hypotheses 1 and 2 (VIFs <1.25, Tolerances >.798). Collinearity was greater for the regression model 
used in the post-hoc analysis (VIFs <= 14.62, Tolerances >= .06). However, because commonality 
analysis models multicollinear data explicitly, it can be used to decompose regression effects even 
when predictor variables are correlated (Ray‐Mukherjee et al., 2014). Regression model parameters 
were estimated using bootstrapping procedures. Data relevant to each model were bootstrapped 5000 
times and 95% confidence intervals were generated. Confidence intervals that do not overlap with zero 
suggest statistically significant effects. All variables entered into these models were standardized. Prior 
to entering variables into these regression models, outliers were detected using the method of Hubert 
and Van der Veeken (2008), as implemented in R’s RobustBase package, because this method is robust 
 
to skewed data. Identified outliers were winsorized (see Fuller, 1991). For further information about 
outlier filtering, see SI Section S4. To view results with outliers included (which were qualitatively 
similar to the results obtained after outlier filtering), see SI Section S5. Although previous research 
indicates that prior exposure to the CRT does not undermine its predictive value (Bialek & Pennycook, 
2017), the analyses described above were repeated with prior exposure to the CRT as a covariate (SI 
Section S6). These analyses yielded results which were extremely similar to those obtained without this 
covariate. 
 Results 
Descriptive Statistics and Zero-Order Correlations 
 Descriptive statistics for all variables of interest can be found in SI Section S7. Paranoia scores 
in the present study were similar to those in a recent study examining the relationship between paranoia 
and analytic reasoning (Freeman, Lister, & Evans, 2014; in that study: M = 22.1, SD = 10.4; in the 
present study: M = 23.51, SD = 13.17, range = 16-77). This result suggests that the present sample 
contained sufficient variation in paranoia to examine how individual differences in paranoia might 
relate to analytic reasoning and other associated outcomes (e.g., belief flexibility). Zero-order 
correlations between variables are depicted in Table 1. 
Hypothesis 1: Engagement in Analytic Reasoning Predicts Bias Against Disconfirmatory 
Evidence 
 In the model involving metrics of belief inflexibility and response bias derived from neutral 
scenarios, Positive Response Bias did not predict Evidence Integration Impairment (belief 
inflexibility), β(228) = 0.15, p = .121, 95% CI = [-0.01 0.32]. However, engagement in analytic 
reasoning did predict Evidence Integration Impairment, β(228) = -0.26, p = .003, 95% CI = [-0.40 -
0.11]. Approximately 8% of the variance in Evidence Integration Impairment was accounted for by 
these predictor variables (adjusted R2 = .08). 
 
 In the model involving metrics of belief inflexibility and interpretation bias derived from 
disconfirming-the-positive scenarios, Negative Interpretation Bias did not predict Positive 
Interpretation Inflexibility, β(227) = 0.01, p = .887, 95% CI = [-0.18 0.17]. However, Positive 
Interpretation Bias predicted Positive Interpretation Inflexibility, β(227) = 0.24, p = .005, 95% CI = 
[0.09 0.40], as did engagement in analytic reasoning, β(227) = -0.28, p = .001, 95% CI = [-0.41 -0.13]. 
Approximately 12% of the variance in Positive Interpretation Inflexibility was accounted for by these 
predictor variables (adjusted R2 = .12). 
  In the model involving metrics of belief inflexibility and interpretation bias derived from 
disconfirming-the-negative scenarios, Negative Interpretation Bias did not predict Negative 
Interpretation Inflexibility, β(227) = -0.09, p = .292, 95% CI = [-0.25 0.05]. However, Positive 
Interpretation Bias predicted Negative Interpretation Inflexibility, β(227) = 0.41, p = .001, 95% CI = 
[0.19 0.58], as did engagement in analytic reasoning, β(227) = -0.21, p = .001, 95% CI = [-0.35 -0.08]. 
Approximately 21% of the variance in Negative Interpretation Inflexibility was accounted for by these 
predictor variables (adjusted R2 = .21). 
 In all three of these multiple regression models, variance in analytic reasoning engagement 
accounted for variance in belief inflexibility that was not accounted for by measures of 
response/interpretation bias. This result is consistent with the possibility that a less analytic cognitive 
style might contribute to belief inflexibility, regardless of the emotional valence of the initial belief or 
of any corresponding disconfirmatory evidence. Additional statistics for these regression models can be 
viewed in SI Section S8. 
Hypothesis 2: Interpretation Inflexibility partially mediates the relationship between engagement 
in analytic reasoning and paranoia 
 The three mediation models reported in this section are described in Table 2 and depicted in 
Figure 1. In each mediation model, the total effect of engagement in analytic reasoning on persecutory 
ideation was significant and negative (path c). Engagement in analytic reasoning was also associated 
 
with less BADE (path a) in all three models. When both engagement in analytic reasoning and BADE 
were entered simultaneously into these regression models, BADE predicted increased paranoia (path 
b). These results suggested that analytic reasoning may exert an indirect effect on paranoia via BADE. 
Critically, when this indirect effect was taken into account, the remaining (direct) effect of analytic 
reasoning on paranoia (path c’) in each model was less strong than the total effect. In all three models, 
the significance of this decrease in strength was confirmed by 95% CIs for the completely standardized 
indirect effect of analytic reasoning on paranoia that did not overlap with zero. The effect size for each 
mediation was small, suggesting that about 9% of the variance in paranoia was accounted for by 
overlapping variance in analytic reasoning engagement and BADE.  
 In all three of these multiple regression models, the previously reported relationship between a 
less analytic cognitive style and paranoia (Freeman, Lister, & Evans, 2014; Freeman, Evans, & Lister, 
2012) was partially mediated by reductions in the ability to revise beliefs in the face of disconfirmatory 
evidence. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that the relationship between reduced 
engagement in analytic reasoning and paranoia may be partially explained by the mutual association of 
these variables with BADE. 
Post-hoc analysis 
 When Evidence Integration Impairment, Negative Interpretation Inflexibility, and Positive 
Interpretation Inflexibility were examined as predictors of paranoia, commonality analysis revealed that 
the majority (89%) of the variance in paranoia explained by the specified model was accounted for by 
variance shared between all three measures of BADE (Table 3). This result suggests that paranoia may 
be primarily related to a general deficit in belief flexibility that spans emotion-laden and emotion-
neutral contexts. 
Discussion 
The results of this study support the hypothesis that engagement in analytic reasoning is 
associated with the ability to revise beliefs in response to disconfirmatory evidence. They are also 
 
consistent with the hypothesis that the relationship between engagement in analytic reasoning and the 
bias against disconfirmatory evidence can partially explain the previously-reported relationship 
between reduced engagement in analytic reasoning and persecutory ideation (Freeman, Lister, & 
Evans, 2014; Freeman, Evans, & Lister, 2012). 
Through these results, the present study builds upon previous theories linking delusions to dual-
process reasoning deficits. For example, Dual Stream Modulation Failure (Speechley & Ngan, 2008) 
suggests that delusion-prone individuals engage in less analytic reasoning in the face of cognitive 
conflict. It has been suggested that this deficit might lead to an increased bias against disconfirmatory 
evidence (Speechley, 2012). This suggestion is broadly consistent with previous research indicating 
that delusional individuals (vs. controls) more often reason according to their preexisting beliefs 
(regarding the validity of syllogism conclusions) rather than available evidence (the internal logic of 
syllogisms) when determining the logical validity of syllogisms (Speechley et al., 2013). In syllogism 
evaluation tasks, responding according to logical validity (rather than preexisting beliefs) is thought to 
be more likely when analytic reasoning is engaged (Speechley et al., 2010). Delusional individuals’ 
increased use of preexisting beliefs (vs. logical structure) to determine syllogism validity therefore 
implies that these individuals may be less likely to engage analytic reasoning processes to revise 
preexisting beliefs according to available evidence. The present study strengthens this interpretation by 
directly linking the bias against disconfirmatory evidence to reduced engagement in analytic reasoning 
for the first time. 
The present study also builds upon previous theory suggesting that reduced engagement in 
analytic reasoning processes for the purpose of overriding intuitions might encourage belief 
inflexibility and thereby maintain paranoia (Ward & Garety, 2017). Preliminary support for this theory 
can be found in research indicating that the reduction in paranoia resulting from the Maudsley Review 
Training Program, a therapy that might increase analytic thinking (see Introduction), may be partially 
explained by the effect of this therapy on belief flexibility (as indexed by reduced recognition that 
 
one’s delusional belief may be mistaken; Garety et al., 2015). The present study provides stronger 
support for this theory by demonstrating that the link between performance on the CRT, which may 
capture the use of analytic reasoning to override intuitive-but-incorrect responses, and paranoia may be 
partially mediated by a different aspect of belief inflexibility—BADE. Through its support for this 
theory and for aspects of Dual Stream Modulation Failure, the present study further elucidates potential 
mechanisms by which reduced engagement in analytic reasoning might encourage and maintain 
delusions. 
Beyond these links with extant theory, the present study extends previous research examining 
delusion-prone individuals’ belief revision deficits in both emotion-laden and emotion-neutral contexts. 
These prior studies (e.g., Buchy, Woodward, & Liotti, 2007; Riccaboni et al., 2012) observed no 
differences between the revision of emotion-laden and emotion-neutral beliefs (that were unrelated to 
delusions) by delusion-prone individuals. Inferences made from these findings regarding the character 
of belief revision deficits in delusion-prone individuals are qualified by the fact that these previous 
studies (unlike the present one) did not systematically vary the valence of the to-be-revised belief 
relative to corresponding disconfirmatory evidence and also did not account for interpretation bias (like 
the bias toward interpretations with a negative emotional valence present in paranoia, see Savulich et 
al., 2015) when evaluating belief revision ability. The present study’s post-hoc commonality analysis 
addresses both of these concerns and suggests that the belief revision deficit in delusion-prone 
individuals is primarily generalized and transcends the boundaries of emotional valence. Notably, this 
result is broadly consistent with the possibility that decreased engagement in analytic reasoning might 
cause reductions in belief revision ability. Research employing syllogism evaluation tasks suggests that 
the reduction in analytic reasoning in delusional individuals, relative to controls, does not differ in 
magnitude across emotion-laden and emotion-neutral contexts (Speechley, Woodward, & Ngan, 2013). 
If reduced engagement in analytic reasoning does impair belief revision ability, one might therefore 
expect the decrease in analytic reasoning observed in this previous research to prompt a general (with 
 
respect to emotional valence) deficit in belief revision ability like that which this study suggests may be 
present in paranoid individuals. 
These associations between belief inflexibility and reduced engagement in analytic reasoning 
provide impetus for discussions of how dual-process reasoning deficits might interact with factors like 
stress and hypersalient evidence-hypothesis matches to maintain clinically significant persecutory 
delusions. Hypersalient evidence-hypothesis matches (the increased weighting of matches between 
available evidence and working hypotheses) have been previously linked to BADE in delusion-prone 
individuals (Balzan et al., 2013; Sanford et al., 2014). In these individuals, hypersalient evidence-
hypothesis matches may increase confidence in intuitive responses (i.e., those generated through 
experiential reasoning). Research on the metacognitive determinants of analytic reasoning engagement 
(Thompson, 2009; Thompson et al., 2011) suggests that this confidence increase may prompt delusion-
prone people to more frequently accept intuitive responses and forgo analytic thinking. Accordingly, 
the present study implies that hypersalient evidence-hypothesis matches might increase BADE by 
discouraging engagement in analytic reasoning. In individuals with psychosis, acute stress may 
exacerbate this effect by prompting excessive dopamine release and thereby influencing low-level 
certainty judgments (Broyd et al., 2017). Broadly consistent with this notion, acute stress may reduce 
engagement in analytic reasoning (see Otto et al., 2013). Acute stress may also encourage BADE by 
depleting the cognitive resources (cognitive control, working memory) on which analytic reasoning 
may depend (see Arnsten, 2015; Qin et al., 2009). Future research should examine these putative 
effects of stress and hypersalient evidence-hypothesis matches on analytic reasoning and belief 
inflexibility to better contextualize the present study’s results within the larger literature on the factors 
influencing delusion-relevant cognitive biases. 
The implications of the present study should be considered in the context of its limitations. One 
such limitation is that although the psychosis continuum model (see Van Os et al., 2000) suggests that 
this study’s conclusions may be applicable to people with clinically significant persecutory delusions, 
 
the preferential drop-out of more paranoid participants in this study (SI Section S0) limits its 
applicability to these individuals. Future research should therefore attempt to replicate this study in 
individuals with clinically significant persecutory delusions. A second limitation of this study is that 
although variance in the metric of belief inflexibility used here-in likely overwhelmingly reflects 
variance in BADE (see Bronstein & Cannon, 2018), it may also capture variance in the bias against 
confirmatory evidence (BACE; see Mclean, Mattiske, & Balzan, 2017). In future research, it may 
therefore be worthwhile to examine potential associations between BACE, analytic thinking, and 
paranoia. The cross-sectional design of the present study also carries limitations. This design precludes 
making causal inferences regarding the relationship between analytic reasoning, belief inflexibility, and 
paranoia. Additionally, this design makes it difficult to conclusively rule out alternative mediation 
models (e.g., ones in which BADE leads to less analytic thinking). This design also increases the 
possibility that this study’s mediation analyses may be biased in their estimation of the parameters 
describing any causal pathways between these variables that unfold over time (see Maxwell & Cole, 
2007). However, mediation analyses conducted in conditions that may not be ideal for inferring 
causality (e.g., those employing cross-sectional data) can still be informative in the context of existing 
research and theory (Hayes & Rockwood, 2017). It is therefore notable that the mediation analyses in 
the present study are strongly consistent with previous theory (e.g., Ward & Garety, 2017) and are 
broadly consistent with the results of an existing mediation analysis based on a longitudinal dataset 
(Garety et al., 2015). 
 Despite these limitations, the present study meaningfully extends existing knowledge of how 
deficits in dual-process reasoning might influence paranoia. The present study provides robust evidence 
across three types of scenarios showing that reduced engagement in analytic reasoning might increase 
individuals’ bias against disconfirmatory evidence, and is consistent with the notion that this effect 
might lead reduced engagement in analytic reasoning to maintain persecutory ideation. These 
implications of the present study suggest that future research should continue to leverage dual-process 
 
reasoning frameworks in attempts to elucidate pathways leading to the formation and maintenance of 
delusions. 
A potentially interesting goal for such future research would be to examine how analytic 
reasoning influences the interplay between paranoia and symptoms of social anxiety or depression (SI 
Section S9). The present study suggests two potential research lines that may help accomplish this goal. 
The first of these research lines is based upon the present study’s observation that reduced engagement 
in analytic reasoning is correlated with impaired revision of emotionally negative beliefs following 
exposure to emotionally positive disconfirmatory evidence. This specific belief revision deficit has 
been previously linked to both anxiety and depression (Everaert et al., 2018), which is intriguing given 
that depression may maintain paranoia (Vorontsova, Garety, & Freeman, 2013), while social anxiety 
may encourage threat-laden interpretations of anomalous experiences that could inspire paranoia in the 
first place (Freeman, 2002). Future research might therefore examine whether reduced engagement in 
analytic reasoning may promote belief revision deficits that increase the severity of depression and 
social anxiety symptoms and thereby encourage paranoia. Given the potential influence of depression 
and social anxiety on paranoia and belief revision deficits, it is notable that symptoms of depression 
and social anxiety cannot account for the results reported in this manuscript (see SI Section S11).  
A second potential line of future research might attempt to explain why the relationship between 
social anxiety and paranoia is stronger in individuals who engage in less analytic reasoning (see SI 
Section S12). Given that a central feature of analytic reasoning is its ability to override intuitive 
interpretations in favor of less-intuitive alternatives (Stanovich & Toplak, 2012), one possible 
explanation for this moderation effect is that analytic reasoning may reduce the chances that individuals 
accept intuitive threat-laden interpretations of anomalous experiences that may be promoted by social 
anxiety and that may encourage paranoia if endorsed.  
These and other investigations leveraging dual-process reasoning frameworks are expected to 
improve our understanding of the cognitive mechanisms that inspire and maintain delusions. In light of 
 
research demonstrating that need-for-care among individuals with persistent psychotic experiences is 
associated with reduced engagement in analytic reasoning (Ward et al., 2017), these investigations are 
also expected to have significant implications for the treatment of individuals with delusional beliefs. 
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Table 1.  
Zero-order correlations between variables of interest 
 2 2 4 5 
1. CRT -.28*** -.11+ -.11 -.14* 
2. GPTS-B  .24*** .23*** .24*** 
3. Neutral II   .75*** .63*** 
4. Positive II    .74*** 
5. Negative II     
Note. CRT = Cognitive Reflection Test. GPTS-B = Green et al. Paranoid Thoughts Scale-B. II = 
Interpretation Inflexibility. Non-parametric (Spearman’s rho) correlations were reported because 
















The relationship between analytic thinking and paranoia is mediated by belief inflexibility 
Model R2 (Mediation) Outcome Predictor Β |t| 95% CI 
1 .09 EII CRT -0.25 4.00 [-0.37 -0.13] 
  GPTS-B EII 0.46 8.00 [0.35 0.57] 
   CRT -0.25 4.49 [-0.36 -0.14] 
  GPTS-B CRT -0.38 5.98 [-0.49 -0.25] 
2 .09 PII CRT -0.27 4.40 [-0.40 -0.15] 
  GPTS-B PII 0.47 8.04 [0.35 0.57] 
   CRT -0.24 4.25 [-0.35 -0.13] 
  GPTS-B CRT -0.38 5.98 [-0.49 -0.25] 
3 .09 NII CRT -0.28 4.41 [-0.40 -0.15] 
  GPTS-B NII 0.47 8.11 [0.35 0.57] 
   CRT -0.24 4.24 [-0.35 -0.13] 
  GPTS-B CRT -0.38 5.98 [-0.49 -0.25] 
Note. The completely standardized indirect effect of analytic thinking on paranoia through belief 
inflexibility in each model is as follows: -0.11[-0.21 -0.06] (Model 1), -0.13 [-0.23 -0.07] (Model 2), -















Results of commonality analysis when all metrics of belief inflexibility are used to predict paranoia. 
 Coefficient (β) Percent of Total R2 
EII 0.01 0.03 
NII 0.00 0.00 
PII 0.00 0.00 
EII + NII 0.00 0.00 
EII + PII 0.01 0.03 
NII + PII 0.01 0.03 
EII + NII + PII 0.25 0.89 
Note. Percentages sum to less than 100 because of rounding error. EII = Evidence Integration 










Figure 1. The relationship between analytic cognitive style and paranoia is partially mediated by belief 
inflexibility. CRT = Cognitive Reflection Test. GPTS-B = Green et al. Paranoid Thoughts Scale-B. Pos. 
= Positive. Neut. = Neutral. Neg. = Negative. II = Interpretation Inflexibility. EII = Evidence 
Integration Impairment. *p < .05. 
